Could You Use That in a Sentence, Please?: The Intersection of Prosecutorial Ethics, Relevant Conduct Sentencing, and Criminal RICO Indictments by McClintock, William S.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 89 | Issue 2 Article 10
2-2014
Could You Use That in a Sentence, Please?: The
Intersection of Prosecutorial Ethics, Relevant
Conduct Sentencing, and Criminal RICO
Indictments
William S. McClintock
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the RICO Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 985
COULD  YOU  USE  THAT  IN  A  SENTENCE,  PLEASE?:
THE  INTERSECTION  OF  PROSECUTORIAL
ETHICS,  RELEVANT  CONDUCT  SENTENCING,
AND  CRIMINAL  RICO  INDICTMENTS
William S. McClintock*
INTRODUCTION
In the last fifty years, two developments transformed federal crim-
inal law.  First, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)1 in 1970, allowing federal prosecutors to
convict those who use enterprises to conduct patterns of racketeering
activity.2  Second, the United States Sentencing Commission promul-
gated the federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987,3 providing a com-
plex sentencing framework intended to create uniformity while still
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School.  I would like to thank
Professor G. Robert Blakey for his advice and guidance with this Note.  Professor
Blakey first noted that the conceptual overlap between RICO’s “pattern of
racketeering activity” and the Guidelines’ “common scheme or plan” concept could
lead to sentencing confusion, and he graciously granted me permission to develop
the idea into a separate paper. See G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, RICO and
Reves: Quo Vadis Professionals? (and a Variety of Other Key Issues), 14 n.8
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“While it is counter-intuitive, courts
sentence on conduct for which a jury returns a not-guilty verdict under a
preponderance of the evidence standard for ‘relevant conduct.’  That conduct is in
the surrounding circumstances of the offense for which the jury returns a guilty
verdict.  RICO, however, is different; the predicate offenses do not have necessarily to
relate to each other, but only to the enterprise.  Thus, when a RICO charge fails
before a jury, which is a relatively rare event, it raises the legitimate concern that the
prosecution brought an extraordinarily weak RICO charge to gain sentencing
advantage by using the un-convicted RICO conduct to aggravate, above the normal
range, the sentence for the predicate offense.” (citations omitted)).
1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. 91-452, tit. IX,
§ 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968
(2006)).
2 For a complete discussion of the RICO Act, see discussion infra Part II.
3 See infra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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preserving judges’ power to consider the unique characteristics of
each crime and defendant.
Both developments have enhanced the power of federal prosecu-
tors.  RICO allows prosecutors to achieve elevated sentences for con-
victed racketeers and to seize the proceeds of racketeering activity.4
Because the Sentencing Guidelines reduce the sentencing discretion
of the judge and place increased weight on the charges that the prose-
cutor brings, they give the prosecutor greater influence over a defen-
dant’s final sentence.5  Although scholars have studied both RICO
and the Sentencing Guidelines in depth, very little has been written
about the ways in which the two frameworks interact.
This Note highlights a potential prosecutorial abuse at the inter-
section of RICO and the Sentencing Guidelines; specifically, how a
weak RICO charge can create an unfair sentencing advantage over a
defendant who is acquitted of that charge but is still convicted of at
least one other count.  Because this sentencing strategy involves two
complex statutory frameworks, this Note requires a detailed overview
of both the RICO Act and the current sentencing regime; this is nec-
essary to clearly demonstrate how a faulty RICO indictment can be
used to conceptually tie together otherwise unrelated acts and achieve
an increased sentence under “relevant conduct” sentencing.
Part I will describe the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
focusing on the concept of “relevant conduct” sentencing.  Part II will
discuss the key concepts of RICO, looking closely at the “relatedness”
requirement for a RICO “pattern of racketeering activity.”  Part III will
demonstrate how a prosecutor could use a weak RICO charge and
allege a “pattern of racketeering activity” to connect two unrelated
acts to one another, in order to argue later that these unrelated acts
were part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme” for the
purposes of relevant conduct sentencing.  This Part will examine the
corruption trial of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman to illus-
trate how RICO’s “pattern” concept can lead to post-trial confusion
when evaluating a defendant’s “common scheme of conduct” at sen-
tencing.  Part IV will argue that a prosecutor who intentionally confuses
these concepts to gain sentencing leverage behaves both unethically
and in a manner contrary to the purposes of the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines.  As a result, this Note will recommend that judges
be informed of this problem and that the Department of Justice pro-
hibit this use of RICO indictments as part of its already-established
RICO oversight process.
4 See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
5 See discussion infra Section I.E.
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I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND “RELEVANT CONDUCT”
A. Historical Overview
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.6
The Sentencing Reform Act established a seven-member Sentencing
Commission to draft Sentencing Guidelines that would take effect in
late 1987.7  The Sentencing Reform Act had as its twin goals achieving
“honesty in sentencing” and eliminating unjustifiably “wide sentenc-
ing disparity.”8  Tasked with these goals, the Commission set out to
transform a byzantine and chaotic array of federal criminal statutes
into a transparent, consistent, and equitable sentencing system.
At their core, the Sentencing Guidelines are a struggle between a
“real-offense” sentencing regime and a “charge-offense” system.9  In a
real-offense system, the prosecutor brings charges under a particular
federal criminal statute.  Once a defendant is convicted, however, that
statute serves no other purpose than to provide the mandatory, but
often wide range within which a judge must sentence the defendant.10
When sentencing, the judge is able to consider factors that were not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.11  The goal is to sentence a
person for the “real” crime that he or she committed, with all of the
unique circumstances that aggravate or mitigate the seriousness of the
offense.  The consequence, however, is that two defendants who are
convicted of the exact same code violation can receive widely dispa-
rate sentences merely because they appear before different judges
who happen to prioritize their sentencing factors differently.  At its
worst, a real-offense system can lead to a situation where a defendant’s
sentence is determined more by the courtroom he is assigned to than
the crime he commits.  The federal sentencing regime prior to the
6 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987.
7 Id.; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and The Key Com-
promises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1988). Now-Justice Breyer’s
article is a thoughtful and comprehensive look at the drafting of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the underlying values that governed the process.
8 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, original intro. (2012) (“Con-
gress . . . sought honesty in sentencing[,] . . . reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentenc[ing] . . . [, and] proportionality in sentenc-
ing . . . that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differ-
ing severity.”).
9 For a thoughtful comparison of real-offense and charge-offense regimes, see
JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 125–31 (5th ed. 2012). See also
Breyer, supra note 7, at 8–13.
10 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 126–27.
11 Id. at 126.
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promulgation of the Guidelines was a real-offense system,12 and these
are some of the very concerns that helped spur the passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act.
A charge-offense system, in contrast, restrains the judge’s discre-
tion and affords more weight to the prosecutor’s formal charges.  If a
defendant is convicted in a pure charge-offense system, he receives
the exact sentence prescribed for that code violation.  Sentence dis-
parities are nonexistent, and defendants’ punishments are not deter-
mined by a particular judge’s individual priorities.  Unfortunately, a
charge-offense system provides uniformity at the expense of carefully
tailored sentences.13
B. Applying the Guidelines
The finalized Sentencing Guidelines are a blend of real-offense
and charge-offense considerations, and they are often referred to as a
“modified real-offense” system.14  Charge-offense rules set a common
foundation for all sentences, but real-offense considerations trigger
structured changes to the baseline sentence.  In this way, violations of
the same code provision begin at the same starting point but are
altered to result in an individually tailored sentence.
At the most general level, a defendant’s sentence is determined
by the interaction between his “offense level” and his “criminal his-
tory.”  Under the Guidelines Manual, the sentencing judge15 calcu-
lates a numerical “score” for both the crime’s offense level and the
defendant’s criminal history.  The judge then applies these “scores” to
the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The offense level forms the vertical axis of the sentencing grid, and
the criminal history level is the horizontal axis.16  The defendant’s sen-
tence, stated in months, is provided at the intersection of the two axes.
12 Id. at 126.
13 Id. at 128 (“[I]mposing a uniform tariff on all persons who violate an undiffer-
entiated criminal code section . . . will only in the most happenstantial [sic] way fur-
ther the purposes of criminal sentencing.  Seeking to effectuate no particular goal
other than the procedurally efficient warehousing of defendants, such a sentencing
system has no more principled basis than sentencing by roulette.”).
14 Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimums, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 377, 381 (2010).
15 Although the sentencing judge determines a defendant’s final sentence and
theoretically makes all the sentencing calculations, the court’s probation officer is
actually responsible for the presentence report and is the person who will make most
of the actual sentencing calculations. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 6A1.1(a) (2012) (Presentence Report) (“The probation officer must conduct a
presentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it imposes.”).
16 See infra Figure 1.
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The Sentencing Table reduces the complex considerations that gov-
ern criminal sentencing into a calculation of stark simplicity.
A defendant’s overall offense level, which forms the Sentencing
Table’s vertical axis, consists of three distinct components added
together: the “base offense level,” the “specific offense characteristics,”
and any “applicable general adjustments.”17  The base offense level,
which forms the foundation for the overall offense level,18 is deter-
mined solely by looking at the “offense of conviction.”19
After determining the base offense level, the court determines
whether any “specific offense characteristics” apply to elevate or
reduce the offense level.20  Specific offense characteristics take into
consideration factors that aggravate or mitigate the seriousness of the
crime.21  Each offense of conviction has special offense characteristics
that are unique to that particular type of offense, and they often deal
with the quantifiable aspects of a crime.  For example, the specific
offense characteristics for larceny and theft offenses include the
amount of money lost in the offense; the greater the loss, the greater
the increase in the offense level.22
Once the specific offense characteristics are added to the offense
level, the sentencing judge then determines whether any “applicable
general adjustments” apply.23  These general adjustments, which are
located in Chapter Three of the Guidelines, are, somewhat obviously,
less specific than Chapter Two’s specific offense characteristics.  Rather
than accounting for the crime’s quantitative variables, they account
for the qualitative and contextual aspects of the crime.  For example,
general adjustments include factors like whether the defendant has
shown remorse,24 whether he acted from a position of power,25 or
whether he obstructed justice.26  General adjustments are real-offense
17 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 132.
18 See id.
19 William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 498 (1990).
20 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 132–33 (quoting Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing
Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on “Substantial Assistance” Departures Follows
a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 11 (1999)).
21 Id.
22 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2012) (providing the spe-
cific offense characteristics for larceny, embezzlement, and other theft-related
offenses).
23 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 133.
24 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2012) (Acceptance of
Responsibility).
25 Id. § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).
26 Id. § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice).
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considerations,27 and they are truly “general”; they apply to all
offenses and are not different for different crimes.28
After applying any general adjustments, the sentencing judge has
the defendant’s overall offense level and has therefore located the ver-
tical coordinate on the Sentencing Table.  The court must then use
the Guidelines Manual to ascertain the defendant’s “criminal history,”
which provides the Table’s horizontal coordinate.  Chapter Four of
the Guidelines Manual explains how to calculate criminal history,
which is determined by the number and nature of a defendant’s prior
criminal offenses.29  Once the criminal history category is compiled,
the sentencing judge has both of the Sentencing Table coordinates
and can determine the sentence range.
FIGURE 130
SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
















1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
Zone C
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
Zone D
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 life life life life life life
27 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 133.
28 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2012)
(“The following adjustments are included in this Part because they may apply to a wide variety
of offenses.”)
29 Id. ch. 4.
30 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A. (2012).
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The Sentencing Guidelines are a complicated system with a num-
ber of “moving parts”; perhaps a simple example will provide clarity.31
Imagine that John Doe is a defendant who was convicted under the
federal kidnapping statute.32  Mr. Doe, who previously served a full
eighteen-month sentence for an unrelated offense, led a gang of
seven people who assisted in the kidnapping.  During the kidnapping,
both of the victim’s legs were broken.
When preparing a presentencing report, the court must first
determine John Doe’s overall offense level.  The judge (or probation
officer) looks to Chapter Two of the sentencing manual and finds the
section entitled “Kidnapping, Abduction, Unlawful Restraint.”33  This
section states that the base offense level for a federal kidnapping con-
viction is thirty-two.34
The base offense level is then modified by any specific offense
characteristics.  For kidnapping, the Guidelines state that “if the vic-
tim sustained serious bodily injury, [the judge should] increase [the
offense level] by [two] levels.”35  Because the victim’s legs were bro-
ken, Mr. Doe’s offense level increases from thirty-two to thirty-four.
Assuming for simplicity’s sake that no other specific offense char-
acteristics apply, the court looks to Chapter Three for any general
adjustments.  Section 3B1.1, entitled “Aggravating Role,” provides that
there should be a general adjustment of four more levels “[i]f the
defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants.”36  Because Mr. Doe led a group of
seven kidnappers, his offense level increases to thirty-eight.
After fixing Mr. Doe’s vertical coordinate offense level at thirty-
eight, the court must still determine his horizontal “criminal history”
coordinate.  Section 4A1.1, entitled “Criminal History Category,”
requires the court to “[a]dd [three] points for each prior sentence
exceeding one year and one month.”37  Because John Doe was sen-
tenced to eighteen months for a previous offense, his criminal history
level is three points.  It is important to remember that a defendant’s
criminal history level stands alone and is not added to his offense
31 For another concrete example that explains the application of the Sentencing
Guidelines, see Simons, supra note 14, at 377–78 (explaining sentencing through a
hypothetical example of three young men convicted of a string of store robberies).
32 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(2) (2006).
33 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A4.1. (2012) (Kidnapping, Abduc-
tion, Unlawful Restraint).
34 Id. § 2A4.1(a).
35 Id. § 2A4.1(b)(2)(B).
36 Id. § 3B.1.1(a).
37 Id. § 4A1.1(a).
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level.  With both coordinates, the court refers to the Sentencing Table
to determine Mr. Doe’s sentencing range.  With an offense level of
thirty-eight and a criminal history level of three, the Guidelines
instruct the sentencing judge to give Mr. Doe a sentence between 292
and 365 months in prison.
C. “Relevant Conduct” Sentencing
Unfortunately, the Sentencing Guidelines are further compli-
cated by the concept of “relevant conduct” sentencing.  Rather than
considering the simple unadorned facts of a crime, the Sentencing
Guidelines require the court to consider all “relevant conduct” sur-
rounding the crime when determining a sentence.  “Relevant con-
duct” is used here as a term of art and refers to more specific conduct
than the plain language of the term might suggest.
Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines Manual, entitled “Relevant Con-
duct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range),” widens the sen-
tencing judge’s lens at the beginning of his inquiry, adding factors
that must be considered for all three components of the offense level/
vertical coordinate (i.e., base offense level, specific offense character-
istics, and general adjustments).38  Because “relevant conduct” is a dif-
ficult concept to grasp, and because the Sentencing Guidelines are
written in a very technical manner, direct and unaided reference to
the manual’s text might be more confusing than enlightening in this
instance.  Fortunately, William Wilkins, former chairman of the
United States Sentencing Commission and former Chief Judge of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, has clarified the relevant conduct
provisions by conceptually dividing the manual’s relevant conduct fac-
tors into three components.  The first component is what Wilkins calls
the “temporal dimension”;39 it mandates that all of the offense level
decisions (those that make up the vertical axis of the Sentencing
Table) should reflect “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omis-
sions . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of con-
viction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting
to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.”40  The second
relevant conduct factor is what Wilkins calls the “accomplice attribu-
tion” dimension,41 and it states that the judge should consider all acts
and omissions “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, [or]
38 Id. § 1B1.3.
39 Wilkins & Steer, supra note 19, at 504–06.
40 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1) (2012).
41 Wilkins & Steer, supra note 19, at 506–13.
2013] rico  and  relevant  conduct  sentencing 993
procured . . . by the defendant.”42  The third component is what Wil-
kins simply refers to as the “third dimension.”43  This component pro-
vides that for offenses that require “grouping,”44 courts should
include all acts or omissions that “were part of the same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan.”45  This third component
widens the range of real-offense information that can be considered
by the judge.
Furthermore, relevant conduct decisions are made on the “pre-
ponderance of the evidence” standard, rather than the “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” standard.46  Even though they are not decided by a
jury and require a lower burden of proof, relevant conduct decisions
can have an enormous impact on the defendant’s actual sentence.
D. Judicial Developments
The United States Supreme Court has wrestled with the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines since their inception.  In Mistretta v. United States,47 the
Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Guidelines, holding that
Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate too much power to the
42 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (2012).
43 Wilkins & Steer, supra note 19, at 513–17.
44 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 (2012) (Groups of Closely
Related Counts).  The Guidelines require grouping where the offenses involve “sub-
stantially the same harm” to the victim or the public.  Examples include counts that
involve the same victim and act, crimes that involve the same victims and a “common
scheme or plan,” and crimes where one count is effectively a specific offense charac-
teristic for another count. Id.
45 Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
46 Id. § 6A1.3 (“In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without
regard to its admissibility . . . provided that the information has sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy.”); see id. cmt. (“The Commission believes that
use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements
and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a
case.”); Wilkins & Steer, supra note 19, at 518–19 (“Pre-guidelines pronouncements by
the United States Supreme Court and other courts indicate that a preponderance of
the evidence standard comports with [F]ifth [A]mendment due process requirements
when sentencing factors . . . are contested.” (footnotes omitted)); Laura Greenwald,
Note, Relevant Conduct and the Impact of the Preponderance Standard of Proof Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Denial of Due Process, 18 VT. L. REV. 529, 531 n.16 (1994)
(collecting cases which have upheld the preponderance standard at sentencing).
47 488 U.S. 361 (1989); see Breyer, supra note 7, at 1 n.3 (elaborating on the
Mistretta holding).
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Sentencing Commission under separation of powers principles.48
Slightly more than ten years later, however, the Supreme Court’s
assessment of state sentencing regimes began to portend trouble for
the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Two cases in the early 2000s foreshadowed serious difficulties for
the Guidelines.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey,49 the petitioner fired shots
into the home of an African-American family.  The state district court
convicted Apprendi under a generic firearms possession statute,
which required a sentence between five and ten years.  However, the
prosecutor argued for an enhancement under the New Jersey hate
crime statute, which permitted the judge to decide by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the underlying crime was motivated by an
intent to intimidate a specific group (e.g., racial minorities).50  The
judge indeed found that Apprendi’s crime was motivated by racial bias
and gave him a twelve-year sentence for that count.  Apprendi
appealed on the grounds that the hate crime enhancement required a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.51  The Court, relying on
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and
jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,52 vacated the sentence and held
that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”53
48 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374 (“[W]e harbor no doubt that Congress’ [sic] delega-
tion of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to
meet constitutional requirements.”).
49 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
50 Id. at 470–71.
51 Id. at 471.
52 Id. at 476, 483–84 (“We do not suggest that trial practices cannot change . . . .
But practice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding the require-
ments of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and prov-
ing those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We thus require this . . . procedural
protection[ ] to ‘provid[e] concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,’
and to reduce the risk of imposing such deprivations erroneously.” (quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970))).
53 Id. at 490 (emphasis added).  The holding in Apprendi relied in part on Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).  In Jones, the defendant was sentenced under 18
U.S.C. § 2119, the federal carjacking statute.  The statute provided for a fifteen year
maximum sentence, but it also contained a subsection that elevated the maximum
sentence to twenty-five years “if serious bodily injury . . . results.”  18 U.S.C. § 2119(2)
(1994) (amended 1996).  The jury convicted without reference to the subsections.  At
sentencing, the judge treated the subsection as a mere sentencing factor reserved to
his discretion.  Accordingly, he found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
carjacking involved bodily injury and therefore imposed a twenty-five year sentence.
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This immediately raised the question of how to define the statutory
maximum for a crime.
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington,54
which grappled with how the Apprendi holding applied to the Wash-
ington state sentencing regime.  In Blakely, the defendant was con-
victed under the state’s kidnapping statute.  However, following the
state sentencing procedures, the judge departed from the default sen-
tencing range and imposed a higher sentence because he found that
the defendant had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” a sentencing factor
that was grounds for an upward departure in Washington.55  The issue
on appeal was whether the elevated sentence exceeded the statutory
maximum and therefore had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
under Apprendi.
For the second-degree kidnapping count, the state’s sentencing
statute called for a sentence between forty-nine and fifty-three
months, but permitted judges to make a different sentence under
compelling circumstances.56  Additionally, the state had a catchall
maximum of ten years (120 months) for all Class B felonies, including
kidnapping.  The judge imposed a ninety-month sentence because he
found that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty,” which per-
mitted a departure under the sentencing statute.  Because the ninety-
month sentence was higher than the range for the kidnapping count
but lower than the catchall maximum, the Court had to decide which
provision provided the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes.57
The government argued that the statutory maximum for the kidnap-
ping was the catchall maximum for Class B felonies, which was ten
years (120 months) and would avoid an Apprendi problem,58 but the
Supreme Court chose to define statutory maximum differently.  The
Court held that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”59
Jones, 526 U.S. at 231.  The Supreme Court, applying the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, decided to construe the subsection as an element of the crime that needed
to be proven to the jury. Id. at 251–52.  An interpretation treating them as sentencing
factors, the Court indicated, would be “open to constitutional doubt [due to ques-
tions of] . . . due process and the guarantee of trial by jury.” Id. at 240.  The Court
addressed those very questions in Apprendi.
54 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
55 Id. at 300.
56 Id. at 299.
57 Id. at 303–04.
58 Id. at 303.
59 Id. at 303.  The Court went on to say, “In other words, the relevant ‘statutory
maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional
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These two cases, although they dealt with state sentencing
regimes, presented a challenge to the federal Guidelines that came to
a head in United States v. Booker.60  In Booker, the jury convicted the
defendant of drug possession, based on “evidence that he had 92.5
grams [of crack] in his duffel bag,” subjecting him under these facts
alone to a base sentence of 210 to 262 months.61  However, at a sen-
tencing hearing, where evidentiary rules do not apply62 and the judge
can therefore consider a wider range of evidence, the judge decided
by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed an addi-
tional 566 grams of crack and “had obstructed justice,” which
required a sentence of 360 months to life.63  Justice Stevens, writing
for a majority of the Court, recognized the irreconcilable problem
created by Apprendi and Booker.  Apprendi held that a judge could not
sentence above the statutory maximum without a jury finding, and
Blakely had established that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”64
Because the Federal Guidelines were mandatory, they required judges
to consider factors and make factual decisions outside the jury find-
ings that then commanded sentences beyond the Blakely statutory
maximum.  As a result, the Court extended the Apprendi and Blakely
holdings to the federal Guidelines.65
Having established that Apprendi applied to the Guidelines, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded his partial majority opinion.  Picking up where
he left off, Justice Breyer, with his unique expertise on the Sentencing
Guidelines,66 authored a second partial majority opinion addressing
the consequences of Stevens’s holding.  Because the Guidelines were
mandatory and thus required a judge to increase a sentence where his
own findings of fact so required, even if they exceeded the statutory
maximum, the Court held that they were unconstitutional.67  To rem-
edy this, the Court simply decided to sever the provisions making
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.” Id. at
303–04.
60 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
61 Id. at 227.
62 See supra note 46.
63 543 U.S. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
64 Id. at 227–28 (majority opinion) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303).
65 Id. at 243–44.
66 See generally Breyer, supra note 7 (discussing the compromises embodied in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
67 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J.).
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them mandatory.68  This effectively made the Guidelines advisory
without abolishing them.  Although the Guidelines were no longer
mandatory, judges were still required to consider them in
sentencing.69
Even though the Guidelines were now only advisory, the Court
imposed new appellate standards of review that preserved much of the
Guidelines’ practical power.  After completing the severability analy-
sis, Justice Breyer imposed a “reasonableness” standard of review.70
Under this standard, a judge must determine the reasonableness of a
sentence in light of the statutory factors that govern sentencing.71
This reasonableness standard was further fleshed out in Rita v. United
States.72  In Rita, the Court decided that any sentencing decision made
within the Sentencing Guidelines’ range for a particular offense is
afforded a “presumption of reasonableness” by appellate courts.73
Because the Guidelines are the product of a deliberate, studied, and
empirically based effort to construct a regime that reflects the under-
lying goals of criminal punishment, which a sentencing judge is
already required to consider, a sentence recommended by the Guide-
lines is presumed to be reasonable at the appellate stage.74
E. The Role of the Prosecutor Under the Sentencing Guidelines
The currently advisory Sentencing Guidelines still afford a federal
prosecutor significant power over a defendant’s final sentence.  The
current sentencing regime provides the Assistant United States Attor-
ney overseeing a prosecution with a wide range of procedural, struc-
tural, and substantive advantages.
Procedurally, the prosecutor has a number of tools to control
sentencing.  First, the sentencing hearing’s preponderance burden75
allows the prosecutor to make arguments at sentencing that might not
be provable beyond a reasonable doubt but are still capable of per-
68 Id. at 245, 259–60 (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (requiring mandatory
sentencing) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (imposing de novo review for sentencing outside
of the guidelines)).
69 Id. at 259 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which requires judges to consider,
inter alia, the sentence recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, remained in
effect after Booker).
70 Id. at 260–62.
71 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (requiring judges to consider, inter alia, the goals
of just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation when sentencing).
72 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
73 Id. at 347.
74 Id. at 350–51.
75 See supra note 46.
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suading a judge.76  Furthermore, evidentiary restrictions do not apply
at a sentencing hearing, so a prosecutor can introduce evidence that
he could not present at trial (e.g., inadmissible hearsay), so long as it
possesses “sufficient indicia of reliability.”77  Lastly, the prosecutor has
the sole power to request a downward departure because the defen-
dant has provided substantial assistance.78
Structurally, the administrative demands on the court give the
prosecutor enormous influence over the sentencing process.
Although the probation office bears the responsibility for creating a
presentence report,79 the administrative burdens placed on probation
office staff and the prosecutor’s superior knowledge of the case means
that courts inevitably rely on prosecutors’ recommendations.80  This
76 Although Booker made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, it did not remove
the judge’s ability to make sentencing decisions based on a preponderance of the
facts.  In United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997), the Supreme Court held that
a sentencing court can consider acquitted conduct so long as it is proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.  The majority in Booker itself affirmed that Watts remained
good law.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 (2005).  The Sixth Circuit, in
United States v. White, clarified this tension, holding that
the Sixth Amendment [does not] prevent[ ] a district court from relying on
acquitted conduct in applying an advisory [G]uidelines system.  In the post-
Booker world, the relevant statutory ceiling is no longer the Guidelines range
but the maximum penalty authorized by the United States Code. . . . So long
as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory ceiling set by
the jury’s verdict, the district court does not abridge the defendant’s right to
a jury trial by looking to other facts, including acquitted conduct, when
selecting a sentence within that statutory range.
United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 384–85 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
77 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 (2012) (Resolution of Disputed
Factors) (“In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing
determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its
admissibility . . . provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.”).
78 See William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 389
n.74, 390 (1995) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1993)
(allowing prosecutors to make a motion seeking downward departures when the
defendant provides substantial assistance)).  Like most prosecutorial decisions, the
decision to seek or refrain from seeking a substantial assistance departure is not sub-
ject to review by appellate courts. Id. at 390–91.  However, the now-advisory Guide-
lines place some check on the prosecutor and restore some discretion to the judge.
See O’SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 134.
79 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.1 (2012) (Presentence Report)
(“The probation officer must conduct a presentence investigation and submit a
report to the court before it imposes sentence . . . .”).
80 See Powell & Cimino, supra note 78, at 383 n.55 (“It should be clear that while
the probation office is intended to act independently on behalf of the court, the real-
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unstated prosecutorial advantage derives neither from the text of the
Guidelines nor the law, but merely from pragmatic concerns gener-
ated by the sentencing structure.
Lastly, and most importantly, the prosecutor has increased sub-
stantive power as a result of the judge’s diminished discretion.  Prior
to the Guidelines, the only limitation on a judge was the wide statutory
range provided in the United States Code.  The Guidelines imposed a
structured framework of offenses, characteristics, and relevant con-
duct factors.  Although they restricted the judge’s discretion, they did
not remove all discretion from sentencing; rather, they simply fron-
tloaded the decisions to the prosecutor because they gave more
weight to the prosecutor’s charges and the facts he chose to present in
court.  This “discretion tradeoff” led to criticism during the
mandatory Guidelines era, leading one district judge to lament that
“Congress has thus shifted discretion from persons who have demon-
strated essential qualifications to the satisfaction of their peers, various
investigatory agencies, and the United States Senate to persons who
may be barely out of law school with scant life experience and whose
common sense may be an unproven asset.”81  The now-advisory Guide-
lines might have restored some discretion to judges, but the Rita pre-
sumption of reasonableness provides a strong incentive for sentencing
judges to remain within the Guidelines range and continues to leave
most of the sentencing discretion with the prosecutor.
The point of this Section is neither to call into question the valid-
ity of the Sentencing Guidelines nor to lament the prosecutor’s role
in sentencing.  Rather, it is merely to show that the prosecutor has a
surprisingly large amount of power over a defendant’s final sentence.
The Guidelines reduce judicial discretion, but they do so by transfer-
ring most of that discretion to federal prosecutors.
II. RACKETEERING INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
A. RICO: Key Concepts
Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act,82 known popularly as RICO, as Title IX of the larger
ity is that probation offices have neither the resources nor the training to conduct
independent investigations prior to sentencing, and rely on Assistant United States
Attorneys to provide sentencing information.”).
81 Powell & Cimino, supra note 78, at 384 (quoting United States v. Boshell, 728
F. Supp. 632, 637 (E.D. Wash. 1990)).
82 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968
(2006)).
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Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.83  As part of the government’s
efforts against organized crime, RICO was passed to provide prosecu-
tors with more effective tools to fight enterprise criminality,84 which
tends to be more dangerous and long-lasting than single crimes and
can persist in the face of multiple prosecutions for discrete crimes.  In
effect, the RICO statute intended to render criminal organizations
themselves illegal, rather than merely the criminal acts they commit.85
As a result, RICO necessarily employs broad and flexible concepts that
are capable of capturing the various manifestations of racketeering
activity.
RICO’s statutory framework is located from 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to
1968.  Section 1961 provides all of the overarching statutory defini-
tions, while § 1962 contains all of the act’s substantive legal prohibi-
tions.  Sections 1963 and 1964 provide for criminal prosecutions and
civil enforcement proceedings, respectively.  Sections 1965 to 1968
provide a number of investigative and procedural provisions that are
not central to the present discussion.86
Section 1962 imposes liability on four different racketeering
behaviors.  Section 1962(a) states that it is “unlawful for any person
who has received any income derived . . . from a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity . . . to use or invest, directly, or indirectly, any part of such
income . . . in acquisition of . . . or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in . . . interstate or foreign com-
merce.”87  Section 1962(b) makes it “unlawful for any person through
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
83 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
84 See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013–14
(1980).
85 Although RICO was written largely with the threat of organized crime in mind,
there is no organized crime element that must be proven in a RICO case. See, e.g.,
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 244 (1989).  The RICO statute applies to
any defendant who meets the stated elements of RICO, whether or not he or she is
involved in a traditional organized crime family. Id. at 248.
86 See 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2006) (establishing venue and process requirements);
id. § 1966 (permitting the “[e]xpedition of actions” in civil cases if the Attorney Gen-
eral files a certificate designating the case to be “of general public importance”); id.
§ 1967 (granting the judge the discretion to close proceedings to the public during
civil RICO actions after considering “the rights of affected persons”); id. § 1968
(establishing a process for a “civil investigative demand” that the Attorney General
can utilize to compel documents related to a RICO investigation).
87 Id. § 1962(a).
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control of any enterprise” engaged in commerce.88  Section 1962(c),
the most utilized and discussed of the RICO provisions, makes it
“unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce[ ] to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”89  The final provi-
sion, § 1962(d), prohibits anyone from conspiring to violate any of
the other provisions in section 1962.90
Sections 1963 and 1964 provide RICO’s enforcement mecha-
nisms.  Section 1964 allows for civil suits to be brought by the federal
government or by private individuals who are “injured in [their] busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of § 1962.”91  For civil suits,
successful private plaintiffs can receive treble damages and attorney’s
fees.92  Civil RICO litigation is an active and complex area of law and
has been the subject of numerous articles, cases, and books.  This
Note, however, addresses criminal sentencing, and for the sake of
brevity, will avoid any detailed discussion of civil RICO actions.
Section 1963 imposes criminal liability for all violations of § 1962.
According to the § 1963, violators “shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
not more than 20 years” or for life if the violation includes a predicate
act with a life imprisonment maximum.93  Criminal RICO convictions
also allow the government to utilize a criminal forfeiture provision
that requires a convicted RICO defendant to forfeit “any interest the
person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962,” any
interest in an “enterprise which the person has established, operated,
controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation
88 Id. § 1962(b).
89 Id. § 1962(c).  The Supreme Court has held that to “conduct or participate. . .
in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs” requires that the defendant has “partici-
pate[d] in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.”  Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For a detailed
analysis of the Reves “operation and management” test, see Blakey & Blakey, supra
note *, at 94–105.
90 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
91 Id. § 1964(c).
92 Id.
93 Id. § 1963(a).  This provides merely the basic statutory maximum for RICO
violations.  As discussed earlier, the Sentencing Guidelines provide a more structured
sentencing regime.  For the RICO base offense level, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2E1.1 (2012) (Unlawful Conduct Relating to Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations), which calls for a base offense level of nineteen for RICO
violations, or thirty to thirty-seven months if there are no general adjustments or crim-
inal history.
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of section 1962,” and any “proceeds” from racketeering activity.94
This forfeiture provision helps to strike a lethal blow against any crimi-
nal enterprise by removing its resources and assets.
Section 1961 provides a long list of statutory definitions, but the
three that are most important are “racketeering activity,” “enterprise,”
and “pattern of racketeering activity.”  Due to the broad language and
framework of RICO, courts have grappled mightily with the scope and
specific definitions of these terms.  This Section will provide a helpful,
although not exhaustive, discussion of the major cases.
The definition of “enterprise” has a complicated judicial history.
The unadorned statutory text defines “enterprise” as “any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity.”95  In United States v. Turkette,96 the Court confronted the enter-
prise concept and held that an enterprise included both legitimate,
legally constituted entities, as well as criminal groups that are not
legally structured, but are nevertheless associations-in-fact.97  In
Turkette, the defense made an ejusdem generis argument that the phrase
“group of individuals associated in fact” should be read to include
only legitimate enterprises because the more specific preceding terms
referred only to legitimate, legal entities.98  The Court dismissed this
argument, holding that the ejusdem generis canon did not apply
because it was clear that the statute intended to include criminal
enterprises, and there was no ambiguity in the statute that would man-
date the canon’s application.99
Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that counting a
criminal organization as an enterprise would collapse “pattern of rack-
eteering activity” with “enterprise” because the same facts, in the con-
text of a criminal organization or gang, would prove the existence of
both elements.100  To rebut this argument, the Court noted the
following:
[T]he Government must prove both the existence of an “enter-
prise” and the connected “pattern of racketeering activity.”  The
enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons asso-
ciated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of
conduct.  The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand,
94 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
95 Id. § 1961(4).
96 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
97 Id. at 580.
98 Id. at 581 (quoting § 1961(4)).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 583.
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a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. . . . While the
proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular
cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.
The “enterprise” is not the “pattern of racketeering activity”; it is an
entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it
engages.  The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a sepa-
rate element [that] must be proved by the Government.101
Although the Court had included criminal organizations within the
enterprise concept, the Court’s attempt to maintain the distinction
between the “pattern of racketeering activity” and “enterprise” con-
cepts was not entirely clear.
The Court attempted to resolve some of this analytical confusion
in Boyle v. United States.102  The case involved a § 1962(c) prosecution
of a defendant who had engaged in a number of bank robberies with
a group of others.  The petitioner challenged his conviction, arguing
that an enterprise had to have “an ascertainable structural hierarchy
distinct from the charged predicate acts,”103 which the bank robbers
did not have.  Writing for the majority, Justice Alito rejected this argu-
ment, holding that an enterprise, although a separate element from a
pattern of racketeering activity, does not need any structure other
than the structure inherently generated by the commission of the
predicate acts; the majority noted that “the existence of an enterprise
may . . . be inferred from the evidence showing that persons associ-
ated with the enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.”104  The Court further elaborated by holding that
an association-in-fact enterprise . . . need not have a hierarchical
structure or a “chain of command”; decisions may be made on an
ad hoc basis . . . .  Members of the group need not have fixed roles;
different members may perform different roles at different times.
The group need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, estab-
lished rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction
or initiation ceremonies. . . . [A] group that does nothing but
engage in extortion through old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and
brutal means may fall squarely within the statute’s reach.105
This served to maintain that criminal groups could still be prosecuted
as RICO enterprises even if they did not have a clear, cognizable, and
formal structure.
101 Id. (citation omitted).
102 556 U.S. 938 (2009).
103 Id. at 943.
104 Id. at 947.
105 Id. at 948.
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In contrast to the enterprise element, the definition of “racke-
teering activity” is the most straightforward of the statutory defini-
tions.  Section 1961(1) defines “racketeering activity” by providing a
long list of other federal and state crimes.106  Several illustrative exam-
ples include bribery, wire fraud, trafficking stolen vehicles, and wit-
ness intimidation.  These crimes are violations of the United States
Code or state law, but § 1961 appropriates them and makes them
“predicate acts” for RICO, which helps to define a pattern of racke-
teering activity.
Although “racketeering activity” is an easily defined concept, a
“pattern of racketeering activity” has proven more complicated.  The
statutory text states that a “ ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission
of a prior act of racketeering activity.”107  The Supreme Court’s big-
gest contribution to the “pattern” element came in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.,108 which involved a RICO class action by
telephone customers alleging that their telephone company rigged
rates by bribing utilities commissioners.109  In its holding, the Court
determined that § 1961(5)’s “pattern of racketeering activity”
required more than simply the commission of two predicate acts; a
pattern is not merely a checklist of racketeering acts that must be
proved by the government.110  At the outset, the Court adopted an
idea from past precedent that although “two acts are necessary [for a
pattern], they may not be sufficient.”111  The Court also noted that
although something more than two predicate acts was required, the
pattern requirement was a “flexible” concept that could be proven in
multiple ways.112  Looking at the legislative history, the Court held
that “to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecu-
tor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that
they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”113
This introduced two new requirements for a pattern of racketeering
activity: a relationship component and a continuity component.
106 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006).
107 Id. § 1961(5).
108 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
109 Id. at 233.
110 Id. at 237.
111 Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 470, 496 n.14 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
112 Id. at 238.
113 Id. at 239.
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To define the relationship requirement (“that the racketeering
predicates are related”), the Court merely adopted a definition from
Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act that “criminal conduct
forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or simi-
lar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are
not isolated events.”114  The Court further elaborated that the rela-
tionship between the predicate acts can be demonstrated not only by
“the relationship that they bear to each other” but also the relation-
ship that they have to “some external organizing principle that ren-
ders them ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged.’”115  This possible alternative
method of proving relationship has caused serious disagreement
between the circuit courts of appeal, and will be discussed in more
detail later.116
According to the Court, the continuity requirement (“that [the
activities] amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activ-
ity”)117 was even broader and more flexible than the already broad
relationship requirement.  The Court simply noted that continuity
could be proven in multiple ways, but that it was largely a temporal
concept that could be demonstrated by a showing that predicate acts
continued over a closed period or threatened, by their nature, to con-
tinue over time.  Although the Court remained deliberately open-
ended in its holding, the majority did state that “[p]redicate acts
extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future
criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement [because] Congress
was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.”118
B. “Pattern of Racketeering Acts”: The “Relatedness” Requirement
The circuit courts of appeal differ widely in their interpretation
of H.J. Inc.’s relationship requirement.  Most circuits, relying directly
on the H.J. Inc. holding and its adoption of the Title X definition for
relationship, hold that predicate acts must be substantively related to
one another in order to be related; this has been termed “horizontal
relatedness.”119  Two circuits, the Third and the Sixth, hold that the
114 Id. at 239–40.
115 Id. at 238.
116 See infra Section II.B.
117 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239.
118 Id. at 242.
119 See, e.g., United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
predicate acts must relate to each other . . . .”); United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 88
(1st Cir. 2004) (“Predicate acts are ‘related’ for RICO purposes if they ‘have the same
or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or other-
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predicate acts only need to be related to a common enterprise; they
do not need to demonstrate any substantive relationship to one
another.120  This type of relationship is referred to as “vertical related-
ness.”  The Second Circuit appears to hold that both vertical and hori-
zontal relatedness must be proven to show a RICO pattern.121  The
wise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events.’” (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cor-
ley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
predicate acts have to share the same purposes, results, etc.); United States v. Keltner,
147 F.3d 662, 669 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding relatedness because property stolen during
one predicate act was used in later predicate acts and because the same person super-
vised and directed different predicates); Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, Educ.,
& Emp’t of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 505–06 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
relationship element was not met where the same enterprise committed two factually
distinct mail and wire fraud schemes against different victims); Heller Fin., Inc. v.
Grammco Computer Sales, Inc., 71 F.3d 518, 523–25 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
wire fraud scheme and commercial bribery scheme committed by same defendant
were “not sufficiently interrelated to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity”
because they had dissimilar results, participants, victims, and methods of commis-
sion); United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he govern-
ment must prove that the predicate acts are related to each other . . . .”); United
States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that multiple campaign
fraud schemes were related because they had similar purposes and results).  For fur-
ther discussion of the relatedness requirements, see Colman McCarthy, Note, Crimi-
nal Relationships: Vertical and Horizontal Relatedness in Criminal RICO, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1493, 1507–08 & nn.103–04 (2009).  McCarthy provides a similar analysis and list
of cases as those provided here and in the following footnotes.
120 See, e.g., United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 296 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
government can prosecute a series of different predicate conspiracies in a single
RICO count.  This can include persons who are not members of the enterprise, but
who conspire with the enterprise to commit predicate offenses as long as the predi-
cate conspiracies relate to the affairs of a single RICO enterprise.”); United States v.
Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 554 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The predicate acts do not necessarily
need to be directly interrelated; they must, however, be connected to the affairs and
operations of the criminal enterprise.”); United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 566
(3d Cir. 1991) (“Our interpretation of RICO’s pattern requirement ensures that sepa-
rately performed, functionally diverse[,] and directly unrelated predicate acts and
offenses will form a pattern under RICO, as long as they all have been undertaken in
furtherance of one or another varied purposes of a common organized crime enter-
prise.”); United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983) (“It is unneces-
sary that the underlying predicate acts be interrelated as long as the acts are
connected to the affairs of the enterprise.”).
121 United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2006) (“This Court has
further developed this requirement of ‘relatedness,’ holding that predicate acts ‘must
be related to each other (“horizontal” relatedness), and they must be related to the
enterprise (“vertical” relatedness).’” (quoting United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d
1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992))). Daidone appears to be a change from an earlier test that
appeared to permit some form of vertical relatedness. See United States v. Locascio, 6
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Tenth Circuit, although it has traditionally favored “horizontal relat-
edness,” has demonstrated an implicit willingness to accept “vertical
relatedness.”122
The relatedness requirement has enormous impact on a federal
prosecutor’s charging decisions.  In a circuit that requires horizontal
relatedness, or requires both horizontal and vertical relatedness like
the Second Circuit, the prosecutor must prove that there is an enter-
prise, that there are the requisite predicate acts, and that those acts
have both the threat of continuity and are related substantively to one
another.  A circuit like the Third or the Sixth provides a little more
“play in the joints” for a federal prosecutor.  In those circuits, the
prosecutor has to prove the existence of an enterprise and the requi-
site predicate acts (plus continuity), but proving the relationship
between the predicate acts is much easier.  He or she merely needs to
connect the predicate acts to the same enterprise to prove related-
ness.  The two predicate acts can be wildly different in scope, aims,
and methods, but they are deemed related if they are performed by
the same enterprise.
III. THE PROBLEM: USING FAULTY RICO INDICTMENTS
TO GAIN A SENTENCING ADVANTAGE
A. The Advantages of a RICO Indictment
Now that the Sentencing Guidelines and RICO have been
explained, the discussion can turn to the central issue of this Note: the
potential abuse of RICO indictments for sentencing advantage.  This
Section will describe a prosecutorial strategy that can be referred to in
the shorthand as the “relatedness-relevant conduct” strategy.  Accord-
ing to this strategy, the prosecutor uses a RICO claim and its related-
ness requirement to mask differences between substantively unrelated
counts so that a judge will consider them “relevant conduct” during
sentencing.
F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We have held that the relatedness requirement is satis-
fied even if the predicate acts are not directly related to each other so long as both are
related to the RICO enterprise in such a way that they become indirectly connected to
each other.”).
122 See United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that
predicate gang attacks were related because they had the similar purpose of maintain-
ing the enterprise’s reputation), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchin-
son, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). But see United States v. Knight, 659 F.3d
1285, 1291–94 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing the flexibility of the relatedness test and
demonstrating an openness towards the Third Circuit’s vertical relatedness approach
without totally embracing it).
1008 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
Suppose that the government has a defendant with one count
that it can confidently prove (the “primary count”).  Imagine further
that the government has less persuasive evidence that the defendant
committed other crimes (the “secondary counts”) that are not closely
related to the stronger count.  The prosecutor can bring individual
counts for all of the crimes, but he or she risks a high chance of
acquittal on all counts but the primary one.  On the other hand, he or
she can add a RICO count and allege that all of the unrelated counts
are part of a common RICO enterprise.  Because of the wide flexibility
in defining a RICO enterprise,123 a creative prosecutor can make a
plausible argument that an enterprise exists in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.  Therefore, these separate events serve both as indi-
vidual counts and as predicate acts for the RICO charge.  Because of
the underlying lack of evidence, the risk of acquittal is still high, but
the prosecutor has a newfound advantage.
Even if the prosecutor fails to prove the RICO count or the secon-
dary counts beyond a reasonable doubt, he or she is still in a stronger
position for sentencing.  By alleging that disparate and only loosely
related acts were related to a common RICO enterprise, the prosecu-
tor can use the trial to advance a theory of a closely connected scheme
of criminal activity.  A prosecutor who asserts throughout a trial that a
defendant’s actions constitute a pattern of racketeering activity effec-
tively spends the whole trial arguing that all of the facts are relevant
conduct, which gives him or her a “head start” on sentencing argu-
ments.  This is clever enough in a circuit that requires horizontal relat-
edness for a RICO pattern; the prosecutor merely has to make a
sufficiently plausible argument that the acts are substantively related
to one another to survive a motion to dismiss the RICO count.  He or
she can then spend the trial arguing that all of the facts are part of the
same pattern, perhaps as a “Hail Mary” attempt to prove a RICO
count, but also with an eye to gain sentencing leverage.
The “relatedness-relevant conduct” strategy, however, is even
shrewder in a circuit that only requires vertical relatedness.  In these
circuits, the prosecutor only needs to plead that factually unrelated
acts are related to a common enterprise.  Even though the acts are
unrelated to one another factually and substantively, the RICO count
effectively becomes the narrative glue relating all the acts together.
The prosecutor spends the whole trial arguing that the alleged predi-
cates are part of the same pattern and related to the same enterprise;
even when the jury acquits on the RICO count, the impression that
the facts are part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme”
123 See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
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remains, and it is not a far cry to assume that a judge might decide by
a preponderance of the evidence that they are relevant conduct to be
considered at sentencing.
B. The Similarity Between the “Third” Dimension of Relevant Conduct
and a RICO Pattern
The conceptual overlap between a RICO pattern of racketeering
activity and “relevant conduct” sentencing considerations reveals why
a prosecutor would be clever to utilize the “relatedness-relevant con-
duct” strategy.  As noted earlier, the factors that are included in rele-
vant conduct consideration are divided into three different sections in
the Sentencing Guidelines:
(1) Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)’s “accomplice attribution” provision,
which includes all acts and omissions attributable to the
defendant;124
(2) Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)’s “temporal” dimension, which
encompasses “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omis-
sions . . . in furtherance” of “the jointly undertaken criminal
activity ([defined as] a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or
enterprise undertaken . . . in concert with others);”125 and
(3) the final relevant conduct provision, which includes every-
thing “that [was] part of the same course of conduct or com-
mon scheme or plan.”126
These concepts, particularly the temporal dimension and the
final “same course of conduct or common scheme” dimension are
very similar to a RICO pattern of racketeering activity.  The temporal
dimension includes all acts that occurred during a jointly undertaken
activity and even goes so far as to utilize the term “enterprise.”  To
commit a RICO violation, an enterprise must carry out a pattern of
activity that has temporal continuity, which would mean that all of the
acts in the pattern are automatically included in the “temporal dimen-
sion.”  The “same course of conduct or common scheme” dimension
also conforms with a RICO pattern; whether “vertical” or “horizontal”
relatedness is required, a RICO pattern must show in some way that
the predicate acts are related (either directly or indirectly), and are
thus part of the same conduct or scheme.
124 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (2012).
125 Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
126 Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).  For further elaboration on the relevant conduct considera-
tions and Judge Wilkins’s taxonomy, see supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the final “same course of conduct” dimension
applies to all counts that require “grouping.”127  As noted earlier,
“grouping” applies to those crimes that involve “substantially the same
harm.”128  Section 3D1.2 of the Guidelines Manual lists multiple ways
that counts can qualify for grouping.  One example points to counts
that “involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions
connected by a common criminal objective.”129  This definition is
remarkably similar to the definition of a RICO pattern of racketeering
activity, which requires two related predicate acts.  In fact, the “same
victim” language is the only difference that distinguishes the two defi-
nitions.  It is a prime example of how RICO’s statutory language tracks
very closely with the language of the “relevant conduct” provisions.
C. Case Study: The Don Siegelman Case
Because of the complexity of the “relatedness-relevant conduct”
strategy, there are no cases where it is clear that a prosecutor has
intentionally used this strategy.  Nevertheless, there are cases where
the conceptual overlap between RICO and the Sentencing Guidelines
led to confusion at sentencing.
The 2006 corruption trial of former Alabama Governor Don Sie-
gelman is an example of a situation where the “relatedness-relevant
conduct” prosecutorial strategy would be likely to arise.  Donald
“Don” Siegelman was the Governor of Alabama from 1999 to 2003.  In
2005, a federal grand jury indicted Siegelman and several others on
thirty-four counts.130  The primary issue at the trial, although multiple
charges were brought, was HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy’s
alleged payment of $500,000 in exchange for a seat on the state’s Cer-
tificate of Need (CON) Board, which regulates health care facilities
like those operated by HealthSouth.131
To be perfectly clear, this Note does not and cannot allege that
the Assistant United States Attorneys in the Siegelman case purposely
employed the “relatedness-relevant conduct” strategy.  The weakness
and ultimate failure of the RICO counts could have been the result of
an overzealous desire to bring a RICO claim, an inability to success-
fully explain RICO’s complexities to the jury, a simple decision by the
127 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2) (2012).
128 Id. § 3D1.2.
129 Id. § 3D1.2(b).
130 Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Siegelman, 467 F. Supp. 2d
1253 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (No. 2:05-CR-119-F) [hereinafter Siegelman Indictment].
131 See Statements Give Glimpse Behind Scrushy-Siegelman Case, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 10, 2006, available on Westlaw at 3/10/06 AP Alert–Alabama 21:50:24.
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jury to split the counts, or any number of other considerations.  Given
the evidence available, it would be unfair and unjust to attribute bad
faith to Siegelman’s prosecutors.  Nevertheless, the Siegelman case
presents a fact pattern where facially weak RICO claims that were
rejected by the jury led to confusion about “relevant conduct” at the
sentencing phase.  As a result, they present a valuable example of
where the “relatedness-relevant conduct” problem could arise.
All thirty-four of the Siegelman indictment counts do not need to
be examined here, but a review of the RICO claims is necessary.
Counts One and Two of the indictment alleged a RICO § 1962(d)
conspiracy and a substantive RICO § 1962(c) violation, respectively.132
The substantive RICO count alleged that Governor Siegelman and his
chief of staff, Paul Hamrick, operated the “Executive Department of
the State of Alabama”133 as an enterprise engaged in a pattern of rack-
eteering activity.  The indictment alleged five separate predicate acts.
The first predicate act alleged that the defendants committed bribery,
wire fraud, and money laundering all in connection to the payments
from Scrushy to Siegelman’s lottery campaign.134  The second predi-
cate act alleged conspiracy to commit extortion, bribery, and mail
fraud related to alleged payments from lobbyist Lanny Young in
return for official acts and favors in relation to a number of business
interests unrelated to the Scrushy affair.135  The third and fourth
predicate acts alleged obstruction of justice in the form of checks paid
by Siegelman aide Nicholas Bailey to Lanny Young in order to hinder
an FBI investigation into Siegelman’s activities.136  In the indictment’s
alleged Racketeering Act 4(b), the grand jury alleged that “defen-
dant [Siegelman] did cause Nicholas D. Bailey to [write him] a check
in the amount of $2,973.35 with the notation ‘balance due on [motor-
cycle]’ with intent to hinder . . . the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion.”137  The fifth and final predicate act alleged that the defendant
engaged in extortion, bribery, money laundering, and mail fraud
involving Alabama Department of Transportation head Gary Mack
Roberts and alleged extortion of transportation contractors Jimmy
132 Siegelman Indictment, supra note 130, at 2, 5.
133 Id. at 13.
134 Id. at 4–7.
135 Id. at 7–11.
136 Id. at 12–13.
137 Id. at 12–19.  The prosecutors alleged that Lanny Young gave Siegelman
money to purchase the motorcycle, and that the check from Bailey was intended to
obscure the transaction.  Kim Chandler, On 27th Day, Prosecution Rests, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, June 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 9953202.
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Lynn Allen and Max Marcato.138  The § 1962(d) conspiracy claim
charged that Siegelman, Hamrick, Siegelman’s aide Nicholas Bailey,
and lobbyist Lanny Young conspired to “participate . . . in the conduct
of the affairs” of the Governor’s Office through a pattern involving
honest services fraud, extortion, money laundering, and obstruction
of justice.139
The RICO claims were facially very weak.  The different predicate
acts alleged various acts of political corruption, but they were all factu-
ally distinct and unrelated to one another; they alleged different vic-
tims and different methods of commission.  Their only relationship
was that they were run out of the enterprise of the “Executive Depart-
ment of the State of Alabama.”140  The Eleventh Circuit, however,
requires horizontal relatedness between the predicate acts.141
Because the indictment did not allege horizontal relations, the RICO
claims should have been dismissed prior to trial.  The § 1962(d) con-
spiracy claim, because it charged unrelated acts as one large conspir-
acy, also had its weaknesses.142
138 Siegelman Indictment, supra note 130, at 2–3, 22–28.
139 Id. at 3.
140 Id. at 2–3.  By defining the RICO enterprise as the state’s executive depart-
ment, the indictment conveniently transformed the Governor, who would otherwise
be an individual defendant, into a RICO enterprise.
141 See supra note 119 (including the Eleventh Circuit amongst those that require
horizontal relatedness).
142 In United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit
encountered the case of a municipal judge who received separate bribes from sepa-
rate defendants. Id. at 1186.  There was no agreement alleged at trial between the
two bribing defendants.  All three were convicted of a § 1962(d) conspiracy. Id. at
1185.  Because there was no agreement between the two bribe-paying defendants to
form a single coherent traditional conspiracy, the government attempted to argue on
appeal that multiple conspiracies can be tried together as a RICO “enterprise conspir-
acy.” Id. at 1191.  They pointed to Sutherland’s judicial office as the enterprise and
glue holding the entire RICO conspiracy claim together.  To make this argument,
they relied on language from United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), that “[RICO’s] effect . . . is to free the government from the strictures of the
multiple conspiracy doctrine and to allow the joint trial of many persons accused of
diversified crimes.” Id. at 900.  The Sutherland court backed away from this language
and held that a RICO conspiracy did not abandon traditional conspiracy elements,
but simply provided a new substantive crime that conspirators can be shown to have
agreed to violate; namely, a RICO conspiracy can arise out of the agreement to form
an enterprise that conducts a pattern of racketeering activity. Sutherland, 656 F.2d at
1192.  Applying the facts to the case at hand, the court held that the prosecutors had
not attempted to prove a RICO conspiracy using two separate conspiracies.  However,
the court held that in Sutherland’s case, the error in defining the RICO conspiracy
was harmless. Id. at 1197–98.
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Nevertheless, all counts proceeded to a jury trial.  The jury acquit-
ted on twenty-five of the thirty-five counts, most importantly on the
two RICO counts.  The jury convicted on Count Three (federal funds
bribery in relation to Scrushy’s payment to get on the CON Board),
Count Five (conspiracy to commit fraud related to the Scrushy-Siegel-
man transaction), Counts Six and Seven (mail fraud in the form of
appointment letters naming HealthSouth employees to the CON
Board), Counts Eight and Nine (mail fraud in the form of letters pro-
viding certificates of need to HealthSouth facilities), and Count Sev-
enteen.143  Count Seventeen was an obstruction of justice violation
related to Nicholas Bailey’s check for the “balance due on [a motorcy-
cle]”; it was the only successful count that was not related to Scrushy
and the CON Board payments.144
At sentencing, the government sought to have all counts consid-
ered together because they were corruption offenses and their offense
levels were “largely based on the amount of harm.”145  The govern-
ment also requested that the court consider the acquitted counts
related to Lanny Young when calculating the harm for sentencing;146
without the RICO count, it would have been very difficult to argue
that the payments from Lanny Young and the Scrushy donation
Siegelman’s case presents some factual similarities, and because Sutherland was
decided prior to the split of the Fifth Circuit, it is binding on Eleventh Circuit judges.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding
that the decisions of the old Fifth Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981
are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).  The RICO conspiracy count in Siegelman’s
indictment flimsily alleged that a number of discrete and factually unrelated transac-
tions constituted a conspiracy because they were run out of an enterprise defined
merely as the “Executive Department of the State of Alabama,” much like the discrete
crimes in Sutherland were purportedly connected through the judge’s office. Siegel-
man Indictment, supra note 130, at 2–3.  As such, the RICO conspiracy claim might
have been reversed on appeal as a result of Sutherland.  The Siegelman indictment
might have avoided the Sutherland pitfall in one way, however.  In Sutherland, the pros-
ecutor named two defendants who had not agreed with each other to do anything,
creating a wheel and spoke conspiracy with no rim. Sutherland, 656 F.2d at 1189–90
(citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755 (1946)).  Siegelman’s prosecu-
tors might have avoided this problem by alleging that the co-conspirators were Ham-
rick and Siegelman, who both worked in the Governor’s Office and clearly knew each
other.  In any event, the point is moot because the jury was not convinced by the
RICO conspiracy claim in the first place.
143 United States v. Siegelman, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 (M.D. Ala. 2006); see
Siegelman Indictment, supra note 130, at 18–22, 24–25.
144 Siegelman Indictment, supra note 130, at 12, 24–25.
145 United States’ Sentencing Memorandum as to Defendant Siegelman at 6,
United States v. Siegelman, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (No. 2:05-CR-119-
MEF).
146 Id. at 3–4.
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should be grouped as part of the “same course of conduct.”  Further-
more, the government also sought an upward departure based on per-
vasive corruption under Section 5K2.0,147 which governs upward
departures above the recommended Guidelines sentence.  The guide-
lines for bribery convictions permit an upward departure if the
“defendant’s conduct was part of a systematic or pervasive corruption
of a governmental function, process, or office that may cause loss of
public confidence in government.”148  In its sentencing motion, the
government sought such an upward departure because Siegelman
“injected corruption throughout the government of the State of
Alabama.”149
Upward departures are not directly influenced by relevant con-
duct considerations, but are governed by the “information specified in
the respective guidelines.”150  Nevertheless, since relevant conduct fac-
tors apply to those same “respective guidelines” that determine
offense level (like specific offense characteristics and general adjust-
ments), relevant conduct considerations still indirectly impact upward
departures.  The Eleventh Circuit later affirmed the trial court’s
upward departure for Siegelman.151
This use of relevant conduct sentencing presents serious
problems.  The jury rejected the RICO charges against Siegelman but
convicted him on several of the individual predicate acts that doubled
147 United States’ Motion for Upward Departure for Systematic and Pervasive Gov-
ernment Corruption at 1, United States v. Siegelman, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Ala.
2006) (No. 2:05-CR-119-MEF) [hereinafter Upward Departure Motion].
148 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 cmt. 7 (2012).
149 Upward Departure Motion, supra note 147, at 1.  The government, in its motion
for an upward departure, relied solely on the convicted counts in seeking an upward
departure for conviction. Id. at 1–2.  As a result, some might argue that the acquitted
RICO counts played no role in the court’s departure determination and that the
“relatedness-relevant conduct” problem did not apply.  However, it remains difficult
to see how Count 17 (the motorcycle check) and the other counts, which all relate to
the Scrushy transaction, create “pervasive” corruption without reference to the acquit-
ted RICO indictments.  Furthermore, the government had already asked the court to
consider the acquitted conduct in calculating the harm and setting the offense level.
If the judge decided by a preponderance that those facts had occurred, it seems cer-
tain that he would consider them when determining whether a corruption departure
was necessary.
150 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(b) (2012) (“Factors in Chap-
ter . . . Five that establish the guideline range shall be determined on the basis of the
conduct and information specified in the respective guidelines.”).
151 United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2011).  Unfortu-
nately, both Siegelman’s appellate lawyers and the circuit panel did not address issues
related to the “relatedness-relevant conduct” problem but instead focused on whether
Siegelman’s public criticisms of the prosecutor influenced the departure.
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as substantive counts (e.g., mail fraud).  This supports the inference
that the jury acquitted not because of any deficiency in the underlying
predicate acts, but because it was unconvinced that there was an enter-
prise or pattern connecting them together.  To turn around and
argue that all the counts should be grouped together at sentencing
flies directly in the face of the jury verdict.
The intentional manipulation of relevant conduct sentencing vio-
lates the spirit of the Sentencing Guidelines.  The relevant conduct
paradigm was not conceived of with large enterprise crimes like RICO
in mind. Relevant conduct sentencing is an attempt to permit judges
to consider real-offense considerations that go beyond the unadorned
code violation and that were not included in the indictment or
charged at trial.  It is one thing to make a judicial determination
about circumstances the jury did not consider at all; for example, the
fact that the defendant lacked remorse or that he abused a position of
power.  It is another thing entirely for a judge to find that a series of
facts are all part of the same course of conduct after a jury has
rejected a RICO charge that for all intents and purposes alleged the
exact same thing.  Although it might be facially legal, it is a manipula-
tion of the sentencing system rather than a faithful application of its
principles.
Some might argue that the differing burdens of proof mitigate
this problem.  A jury could decide that there was reasonable doubt
that the acts were sufficiently related and thus that they did not form
RICO pattern, and a judge could still decide by a preponderance of
the evidence that the acts were sufficiently related for relevant con-
duct in the Sentencing Guidelines context.  This is true, but the prob-
lem is the prosecutorial methods that are used to encourage this
finding by the judge.  When a prosecutor brings a charge, he is stating
that he intends to prove that count beyond a reasonable doubt; if he
does not think that he can prove a RICO count or that the count is
particularly weak, but will serve the advantageous effect of making
conduct seem more closely related than it actually is, he is manipulat-
ing his indictment power for ends it was not designed to serve.
IV. REMEDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Constitutional Analysis
This Part will examine the implications of the “relatedness-rele-
vant conduct” strategy.  Given the current case law, the strategy is not
facially unconstitutional.  In United States v. Watts,152 the Court
152 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).
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decided a case where the police had discovered cocaine base and two
guns hidden in a defendant’s home.  The jury convicted the peti-
tioner of a cocaine possession offense, but acquitted him of a firearms
offense.  The sentencing judge then decided by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant indeed used the guns in the commis-
sion of the crime and elevated his sentence accordingly.153  The Ninth
Circuit reversed and held that the acquitted facts could not be consid-
ered at sentencing.  However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, holding that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the
sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted
charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance
of the evidence.”154  Relying on the difference between the reasonable
doubt and preponderance standards, the Court determined that a
jury could logically decide that there was reasonable doubt and acquit,
while a judge could subsequently decide that the conduct was more
likely committed than not, permitting him to sentence on that con-
duct.  Under this analysis, it is not unconstitutional for a judge to con-
sider an acquitted RICO charge when determining a defendant’s
sentence.
B. Ethical Analysis
Just because the “relatedness-relevant conduct” problem is not
unconstitutional does not mean that its intentional use is ethical.
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 states explicitly that
“[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting
a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause.”155  If a federal prosecutor brings a RICO claim that he knows
is unlikely to succeed, but does so merely to connect substantively
unrelated acts, then he or she does not have probable cause to bring
the charge.  In this instance, he would be abusing his discretion and
subverting the spirit of the sentencing regime, which was constructed
in order to achieve “honesty in sentencing.”156
C. Education of Defense Attorneys and Sentencing Judges
This discussion of the “relatedness-relevant conduct” strategy can-
not end with a perfunctory conclusion that its use is unethical; some
solution or remedy must be proposed.  Although it is difficult to
explain the “relatedness-relevant conduct” strategy, it is not difficult to
153 Id. at 149–50.  For more on Watts, see supra note 76.
154 Watts, 519 U.S. at 157.
155 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2013).
156 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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identify its solution.  One of the easiest ways to prevent prosecutors
from abusing RICO indictments is to educate judges and defense
attorneys about its potential.  If defense attorneys are aware of possi-
ble abuse, they can inform the sentencing judge.  If a judge knows of
this problem, he or she can factor it into his or her sentencing consid-
erations.  Now that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory,157 the
judge is not tightly bound to the prosecutor’s charging decisions and
can depart from the Guidelines if justice requires it.  If a district judge
suspects that RICO counts were brought in order to make unrelated
conduct appear related during the sentencing phase, then he can
resist the government’s attempts to increase a defendant’s sentence.
These educational efforts can be carried out through legal scholar-
ship, continuing legal education forums, or any other number of
avenues.
D. The Department of Justice’s Regulation of RICO Proceedings
Although legal education is important, the most effective way to
prevent federal prosecutors from bringing frivolous RICO claims for
sentencing gain is for the Department of Justice to step in and solve
the problem.  Because the Department of Justice already supervises
federal RICO prosecutions, it can easily remedy the situation.  The
DOJ already publishes a manual that governs criminal RICO indict-
ments by United States Attorneys’ Offices.  The manual provides an
overview of the statute and the DOJ’s RICO policies.  The current
manual has a section entitled “Application of Sentencing Guidelines
to RICO,” which describes sentencing issues.158  A simple amendment
could introduce a new section explaining the “relatedness-relevant
conduct” problem and prohibiting Assistant United States’ Attorneys
from charging weak RICO claims for sentencing purposes.
Once in place, this prohibition could then be enforced through
the DOJ’s RICO approval process.  The RICO statute is unique
because the federal government exercises more oversight over RICO
indictments than it does over other federal criminal statutes.  Cur-
rently, “[n]o [RICO] indictment, information, or complaint [can] be
filed without the prior approval of the [Organized Crime and Gang
Section].”159  According to the United States Attorneys’ Manual, “[n]o
criminal or civil prosecution or civil investigative demand [can] be
157 See supra Section I.D (discussing judicial sentencing developments).
158 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION, CRIMINAL
RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 163–78 (5th rev.
ed. Oct. 2009).
159 Id. at 17.
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commenced or issued under the RICO statute without the prior
approval of the . . . Criminal Division.”160
Because the Department of Justice exercises oversight over RICO,
the “relatedness-relevant conduct” problem can be solved without
amending the Sentencing Guidelines or the RICO statute.  By simply
adding the “relatedness-relevant conduct” problem to the DOJ’s list of
pre-approval considerations, this unethical prosecutorial strategy can
be eliminated.  If DOJ attorneys who review proposed RICO indict-
ments explicitly include this factor in their formal considerations,
then its abuse can be severely curtailed.
CONCLUSION
In 1935, Justice Benjamin Sutherland of the United States
Supreme Court wrote:
 The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordi-
nary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do
so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones.161
This Note has demonstrated how a defendant could be acquitted
of a RICO charge and yet receive a higher sentence than a similarly
situated defendant who was not charged under RICO.  The intent of
this Note is not to criticize the RICO statute, the current sentencing
regime, or the powers granted to federal prosecutors; all three con-
tribute greatly to the functioning of the federal criminal legal system.
Rather, its purpose is to counsel federal prosecutors to exercise vigi-
lance and extreme care when prosecuting defendants under complex
criminal statutes like RICO.  When dealing with complex frameworks
like the Sentencing Guidelines or RICO, attorneys have a responsibil-
ity to be intellectually disciplined, precise, and honest in their argu-
ments.  By illustrating an interesting conceptual overlap between parts
of the RICO statute and the Sentencing Guidelines, this Note
attempted to show one example in which two conceptually dense stat-
160 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-110.320 (1997),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/110
mcrm.htm.
161 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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utory systems can lead to confusion and potential prosecutorial abuse
in criminal sentencing.  By noting this overlap and cautioning against
its abuse, the RICO statute and the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines can continue to function both honestly and efficiently.
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